

New Vulnerabilities Upon Pomaranch Boolean Function Through Fault Injection Analysis (FIA)

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ABSTRACT

Pomaranch stream cipher is a synchronous stream cipher submitted to eSTREAM, the ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project and was designed by Jansen et al. and published in 2006. In this algorithm, the Boolean function given with coefficients, n is equal to five (5) and its degree, d is equal to three (3). In conducting this attack, we aim to decrease the degree of the targeted Boolean equation by finding its vulnerability with constructing low degree annihilator equation(s). We adopt the Fault Injection Analysis (FIA) methodology to achieve our objectives. In this study, we found the vulnerability via annihilator(s) through FIA (inject with value of one (1)) on Boolean function of Pomaranch. With these injected Boolean functions, we proceed to utilize Hao's method to find new annihilator(s). Then we obtained new annihilator(s) on Boolean function of Pomaranch stream cipher. As a result, these newly identified annihilators successfully reduce the complexity of the published Boolean function to guess the initial secret key. It likewise gives truly necessary data on the security of these chosen stream cipher concerning Fault Injection Analysis.

Keywords: Vulnerabilities, Annihilator, Boolean function, Fault Injection Analysis (FIA), Stream Cipher, Algebraic Attack

1 INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, algebraic attack has received a lot of attention in cryptanalysis of stream and block cipher systems. In stream cipher, we have two (2) standard models;

1. Non-Linear Filter Model based.

Definition 1.1. *Boolean function combines outputs of different cells of a single Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR).*

2. Non-Linear Combiner Model based.

Definition 1.2. *Boolean function combines outputs of several Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs).*

(Katz et al., 1996) In Boolean functions as the nonlinear filter functions in LFSR-based stream ciphers have annihilators of low algebraic degree, then the ciphers may be susceptible to algebraic attacks. Finding of annihilators of Boolean function is best problem to be covered (Roy et al., 2015). Therefore, the security of such cipher relies on the appropriate choice of Boolean functions. The Boolean functions should satisfy a number of cryptographic properties in order to be a cryptographically strong Boolean function.

Algebraic immunity (AI) is an important cryptographic characteristic of a Boolean function. Low algebraic immunity of a function means that this function has an annihilating multiplier of low algebraic degree. The problem of annihilator seeking was initially discussed in [XX] and [XX]. Let \mathbb{F}_2 be the field of two elements, $V_n = \mathbb{F}_2^n$ be the vector space of n -tuples over \mathbb{F}_2 , \mathbb{F}_n be the set of all functions $\mathbb{F}_2^n \Rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2$. By $\deg f$ denote algebraic degree of a Boolean function f element \mathbb{F}_n . A Boolean function $g \in \mathbb{F}_n$ is called an annihilator of $f \in \mathbb{F}_n$ if $f \cdot g = 0$. We shall use the following notation:

1.1 Boolean Functions in Stream Cipher

This subsection provides introduction on boolean functions (Carlet, 2010).

Definition 1.3. (Boolean function). *A boolean function on n may be viewed as a mapping from $\{0, 1\}^n$ into $\{0, 1\}$. A boolean function $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ is also can be write as the output of its truth table f .*

Definition 1.4. Algebraic normal form of boolean function - ANF). Every boolean function f can be expressed as a multivariate polynomial over \mathbb{F}_2 . This polynomial is known as algebraic normal form of the boolean function f . The general form of algebraic normal form of f is given by,

$$f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = a_0 \oplus \bigoplus_{1 \leq i \leq n} a_1 x_i \oplus \bigoplus_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} \oplus \dots \oplus a_{12 \dots n} x_1 x_2 \dots x_n. \quad (1)$$

Definition 1.5. Degree of boolean function) Degree of a boolean function f is defined as $\text{deg}(f)$ = number of variables in the highest order product term in the algebraic normal form of f . Functions of degree at most one are called affine function. An affine function with constant term equal to zero is called linear function.

Definition 1.6. Annihilator of a boolean function A non-zero boolean function g of n variables is said to be an annihilator of a boolean function $f \iff g(X) \cdot f(X) = 0, \forall X \in \{0, 1\}^n$.

2 DESCRIPTION POMARANCH

Pomaranch (Jansen et al., 2006) is a synchronous stream cipher submitted to eSTREAM, the ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project. The cipher is constructed as a cascade clock control sequence generator, which is based on the notion of jump registers. Pomaranch is one of the 34 stream ciphers submitted to eSTREAM, the ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project. The cipher is implemented as a binary one clock pulse cascade clock control sequence generator, and uses 128-bit keys and IVs of length between 64 and 112 bits. The construction is based on the notion of *jump registers*.

Jump controlled LFSRs were introduced by Jansen (2004) as alternative to traditional clock-controlled registers. In jump controlled LFSRs, the registers are able to move to a state that is more than one step ahead without having to step through all the intermediate states (thus the name jump registers). The main motivation for the proposal of jump registers is to construct LFSR-based ciphers that can be efficiently protected against side-channel attacks while preserving the advantages of irregular clocking.

2.1 Design of Pomaranch

Pomaranch design is in Figure 1 below, where only the key stream generation phase is represented (called Key Stream Generation Mode). The cipher consists of nine cascaded jump registers R_1 to R_9 . The jump registers are implemented as autonomous

Linear Finite State Machine (LFSM), built on 14 memory cells, which behave either as simple delay shift cells or feedback cells, depending on the value of the so-called Jump Control (JC) signal. At any moment, half of the cells in the registers are shift cells, while the other half are feedback cells. The initial configuration of cells is determined by the LFSM transition matrix A , and is used if the JC value is zero. If JC is one, all cells are switched to the opposite mode. This is equivalent to switching the transition matrix to $(A + 1)|3$.




Figure 1: The Pomaranch stream cipher

The 128-bit key K is divided into eight 16-bit subkeys k_1 to k_8 . At time t , the current state of the registers R_1^t to R_8^t are non linearly filtered, using a function that involves the corresponding subkey k_i . These functions provide as output eight bits c_1^t to c_8^t , which are used to produce the jump control bits JC_2^t to JC_9^t controlling the registers R_2 to R_9 at time t , as following:

$$JC_i^t = c_i^t \oplus \dots \oplus c_{i-1}^t$$

for $i = 2, \dots, 9$.

The jump control bit JC_1 of register R_1 is permanently set to zero. The key stream bit z^t produced at time t is the XOR of nine bit r_1^t to r_9^t selected at fixed positions of the current register states R_1^t to R_9^t .

2.1.1 Key and IV Loading

During the cipher initialization, the content of registers R_1 to R_9 are first set to non-zero constant 14-bit values derived from π , then the subkeys k_i are loaded and the registers are run for 128 steps in a special mode (called Shift Mode). The main difference between the Key Stream Generation Mode and the Shift Mode is that, in the latter the output of the filtering function of register R_i (denoted by c_i) is added to the feedback of register R_{i+1} , with the tap from cell 1 in the register R_9 being added to the

register R_1 , making then what can be seen as a "big loop". Note that the configuration of the jump registers do not change in this mode (they all operate as if $JC_i = 0$). This process ensures that the states of the registers R_1 and R_9 after this key loading phase depend upon the entire key K . We denote these states by R_1^K to R_9^K .

Next the IV is loaded into the registers. The IV can have any arbitrary length between 64 and 112 bits. If the IV length is shorter than 112 bits, it is expanded by cyclically repeating it until a length of exactly 112 bits is obtained. This new string is then loaded into the registers as described below. In the remaining of this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the IV length is exactly 112 bits.

The IV is loaded into the registers in the following manner: the 112-bit IV is split into eight 14-bit parts IV_1 to IV_8 , which are XORed with the 14-bit states of registers R_1^K to R_8^K obtained at the end of the key loading. If any of the resulting states consists of 14 null bits, its lowest weight bit is set to one (this ensures that no state will be made up entirely of null bits). The resulting register states R_1 to R_8 form together with R_9^K the nine initial states. We denote these resulting 14-bit state values by R_1^{128} to R_9^{128} . The key stream generation mode of Figure 1 is now activated, and the run-up consists of 128 steps in which the produced key stream bits are discarded.

3 BASIC STUDY ON BOOLEAN FUNCTION

Definition 3.1. (Boolean function). A boolean function on n may be viewed as a mapping from $\{0, 1\}^n$ into $\{0, 1\}$. A boolean function $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ is also can be write as the output of its truth table f .

Definition 3.2. Algebraic normal form of boolean function - ANF). Every boolean function f can be expressed as a multivariate polynomial over \mathbb{F}_2 . This polynomial is known as algebraic normal form of the boolean function f . The general form of algebraic normal form of f is given by,

$$f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = a_0 \oplus \bigoplus_{1 \leq i \leq n} a_1 x_i \oplus \bigoplus_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} \oplus \dots \oplus a_{12 \dots n} x_1 x_2 \dots x_n. \quad (2)$$

Definition 3.3. Degree of boolean function) Degree of a boolean function f is defined as $\text{deg}(f) =$ number of variables in the highest order product term in the algebraic normal form of f . Functions of degree at most one are called affine function. An affine function with constant term equal to zero is called linear function.

Definition 3.4. Annihilator of a boolean function A non-zero boolean function g of n variables is said to be a annihilator of a boolean function $f \iff g(X) \cdot f(X) = 0, \forall X \in \{0, 1\}^n$.

Theorem 3.1. *Let f be any boolean function in B_n . Then there exists annihilator of f with degree $\leq d$ if and only if there exists $h \in B_n$ with degree $\leq d$ such that the degree of $(1 + f)h = g \leq d$.*

4 DEFINITION OF OUR FAULT INJECTION ANALYSIS (FIA) ON POMARANCHS BOOLEAN FUNCTION

The attacker is assumed able to inject exactly one bit (1 or 0) in any one of active coefficients in the Boolean function. In Pomaranch, Boolean function is defined as:

$$h(x) = x_1 + x_2 + x_5 + x_1x_3 + x_2x_4 + x_1x_3x_4 + x_2x_3x_4 + x_3x_4x_5. \quad (3)$$

This paper will inject value of one (1) in each active coefficients of Pomaranch Boolean function. For example, in Pomaranchs Boolean function, we get **fourteen** (14) active coefficients such as below:

1. x_1
2. x_2
3. x_3
4. x_4
5. x_5
6. x_1x_3
7. x_1x_4
8. x_2x_3
9. x_2x_4
10. x_3x_4
11. x_3x_5

12. $x_1x_3x_4$

13. $x_2x_3x_4$

14. $x_3x_4x_5$

With these **fourteen** ($i = 49$) active coefficients so we have fourteen (19) new injected Boolean function. So let new injected Boolean function defined as $h_i(x)$. From all new derived Boolean function, we will use HAOs algorithm to find annihilator(s) of the current/injected Boolean function. For example, we inject with bit-1 into active coefficients $x_1 = 1$ so we will get;

$$1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_5 + x_2x_4 + x_3x_4 + x_2x_3x_4 + x_3x_4x_5 \quad (4)$$

5 ANALYSIS

The adversary is assumed able to inject exactly one bit (bit 1) in any one of active coefficients in the Boolean function. In this paper, we will inject value of one (bit-1) into Pomaranchs Boolean function. All new injected Boolean function is defined as Table 1 until Table 8.

Output for M_d as in Hao's Method for $C = \{p \cdot f | p \in A_d\}$ as shown in figure below. The first block (**Table 1**) (highlight) is value of M_d from original boolean function and the rest is value of M_d from injected boolean function.

$h_i(x)$	$M_d(h_i)$
0	1000011010000000101000000100100
	0100010000110001000001000100010
	0000000001000100001000001000000
	0000000100000010000001001000000
	0000100010010000000100011000110
	00000000000000001110000000000001
	00000000000000001001100000000100
	00000001000000000000010000100100
	000000000000000000010100000001001
	00000000010000000000000100100010
	000000000000000000100001010000010
	00000000000000000010000010010001
	00000000000000000001001000000000
	000000000000000100000000101000100
	000000000000000010000010001000010
	000000000000000010000010001000010
1	101101000001010000000001001000000
	010000110100000001010000000100100
	000000000011100000000000000000010
	000000000010011000000000001000000
	000010000000000100000010010000000
	00000000000010100000000010000010
	00000000000000001110000000000001
	00000000000000001001100000000100
	00000000100000000000010000100100
	000000000000000000010100000001001
	00000000001000000000001100000010
	0000000000000100000000001010000010
	0000000000000000000001100000010
	00000000000000000000001010000010
	00000000000000000000000110000000
	00000000000000000000000100000000
00000000000000000000000010000010	

Table 1: M_d Pomaranch page 1

$h_i(x)$	$M_d(h_i)$
2	11001101000001000001000001000000 00000001110000000000000000000100 00100010000110001000001000100010 0001000000000100001000001000000 0000000010000101000000000100000 00000000010000010000100000000100 00000000000000000111000000000001 00000001000000000001100000000100 00000000100000000001010000000100 00000000010000000000110000000100 00000000001000000000000100100010 000000000000000000010000101000010 000000000000000000010000010010001 0000000000000100000100000000000 0000000000000000000000000001000100 00000000000000001000001000000000
3	00000101100000000000010000000000 0100000000010000100000010000000 0000000001000100001000001000000 0000000100100000000000000000000 0000100000010010000010000000000 0000010000000000110000000001000 0000000000000001001100000000100 0000000100000000100000000000000 0000000010000000010000000000000 0000000001000000000000100100010 0000000000100000100000000000000 00000000000000000000000010001000 00000000000000000000000010010000 000000000000000000000000101000100 0000000000000000000000001001000000

Table 2: M_d Pomaranch page 2

$h_i(x)$	$M_d(h_i)$
4	10000000000000000000000000100000000000 00000100000000000000000000100000000000 0000001000000010000000000000000000000 000000010000000000000000000010000000 000000001000010000000000000000000000 0000010000000000000000000000000010000 000000100000000000000010000000000000 000000010000000000000000000000000100 000000001000000000000010000000000000 0000000000000000010000001000000000 00000000000000000010000000000000010 0000000000000000000100001000000000 0000000000000000000010000010000000 0000000000000000001000001000000000 0000000000000000000000100010000000
5	11100001000101000001001000000000 0000001100000000001000000000100000 0000001000010000100000000000100000 0001000000100100000010000000000000 0000100010000100000000001000000000 0000010001001000000000100011000110 0000001000000000011000000000100000 0000000010000000001000000000000000 000000000000000000000010000000100000 000000000000000000000101000000001001 00000000000000000000000000001000100000 000000000000001000000100000000000000 0000000000000000000000100000010010001 00000000000000000000000000100100000000 000000000000000000001000000000101000100 000000000000000000000010000010001000010

Table 3: M_d Pomaranch page 3

$h_i(x)$	$M_d(h_i)$
6	11101100000100000000001001000000 00000010110000000100000000100100 0000001000001000000000100000010 00010001001001100000000001000000 00000000100000010000001001000000 00000000010010010000000011000010 00000010000000000010000000100001 000000000000000001001100000000100 00000000100000000000010000100100 000000000100000000010010000001101 0000000000000000001000001100000010 000000000000000000100001010000010 00000000000001000001000000000000 00000000000000000000100100000000 00000000000000000000010010000000 0000000000000000001000001000010
7	1000010010000000100000000100100 0100010001110001000001000000010 00100000010001000000000001000000 0000000100001010001001001000000 0000100010010100000100011000010 00000000000000000110000000100001 00000010000000001000100000000100 00000001000000000000010000100100 000000000000000000010000000001101 00000000000000000000000100000010 0000000000000000000100000010100010 000000000000000000010000110010000 00000000000001000000001000000000 00000000000000000000000101000000 00000000000000010000010000000110

Table 4: M_d Pomaranch page 4

$h_i(x)$	$M_d(h_i)$
8	100001111100000000101000000000100
	0100010000010001000000000100010
	0000000001001100001001001000000
	00010001000000100000000001000000
	0000100010010010010000100011000100
	000000000000000010100000000100001
	000000000000000010001000000100100
	000000000000000000000000010000000100
	0000000000000000000010110000001000
	000000000100000000000001001000010
	00000000001000001000000100000010
	0000000000000000000010000000010011
	00000000000001000001000000000000
	00000000000000100000000100000110
	000000000000000000000000010001000000
	9
0000001001000000000001000000000100	
000000100010100010000000000100010	
00000000001000100001000001000000	
0000100010010101010000000001000000	
0000000001001010100000100001000100	
0000001000000000000010000000100001	
00000000000000000001001100000000100	
0000000000000000000101010000000100	
00000000010000000001000000000000	
000000000010000000000000100100010	
00000000000000000000100001010000010	
000000000000010000010000100010011	
0000000000000000000001001000000000	
00000000000000000100000000101000100	
00000000000000000000000001001000000	

Table 5: M_d Pomaranch page 5

$h_i(x)$	$M_d(h_i)$
10	000000100000000010000000000000
	000000000010000100000000000000
	000000100000000000000010000000
	000000000010000000100000000000
	00000000000000000000100010000000
	00000000000000000110000000000000
	00000010000000000000000000100000
	00000000000000000101000000000000
	00000000000000000000100000001000
	00000000000000000100000100000000
	00000000001000000000000000100000
	000000000000000000000000010010000
	000000000000000000000000010010000
	000000000000000000000000010010000
	00000000000000000000000001000000010
	000000000000000000000000010000100
11	1000011110000000101000000100000
	0100010000010001000001000100000
	0000000001001100001000000000000
	0001000100000010000001000000000
	0000100010010010000100010000110
	00000000000000000101000000000000
	00000000000000000100010000000000
	00000000000000000000010000100000
	000000000000000000010110000001101
	0000000001000000000001100100000
	0000000000100000100001010000000
	000000000000000000010000000010011
	000000000000000001000001001000000
	0000000000000000010000000101000100
	00000000000000000000000001000000010

Table 6: M_d Pomaranch page 6

$h_i(x)$	$M_d(h_i)$
12	1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
	0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
	0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
13	1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
	0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
	0 1 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
	0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

Table 7: M_d Pomaranch page 7

$h_i(x)$	$M_d(h_i)$
14	1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
	0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0	
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0	

Table 8: M_d Pomaranch page 8

Meanwhile below figure is the output for M_d^* and the highlight block is where got at least one **zero row(s)** as shown in figure below. $h_0(x)$ is generated form original boolean function, and the rest is from injected boolean function.

$h_i(x)$	$M_d^*(h_i)$
0	1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 2/3 -1/3 10/3 4/3 0
	0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4 0 0 -1 -1/3 2/3 -8/3 -2/3 0
	0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 -1/3 -1/3 1/3 1/3 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
	0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
	0 -1 0 1 -1 0 0 -1 0 0
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1/3 -2/3 5/3 2/3 0
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 0 -1 -2/3 1/3 -4/3 -1/3 0
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/3 1/3 -1/3 -1/3 1
	0 1 0 0 0 -2 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 -1 0
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -1/3 2/3 1/3 1/3 0
	0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
	0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
	0 1 0 0 2/3 -1/3 1/3 1/3 0
	1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0	
0 0 0 0 1 0 -2 0	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 -1 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0	
0 1 0 0 0 0 0	
0 1 0 0 0 0 0	
0 1 0 0 0 0 0	
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0	

Table 9: M_d^* Pomaranch Page 1

$h_i(x)$	$M_d^*(h_i)$	
2	11001100000000000000000000000000-100	
	0010001000011000000000002020110020	
	000100000000000100000000000000-200	
	00000001000000000000000000000000	
	00000000100000000000000000000000	
	000000000100000000000000000000100	
	0000000000100000000000000100100010	
	000000000000000100000000000000-100	
	00000000000000001000000000000000	
	00000000000000000100000-10-200-100-10	
	00000000000000000001000001010000010	
	0000000000000000000010000010010001	
	0000000000000000000001000000000100	
	0000000000000000000000100000000000	
	0000000000000000000000010000000000	
	00000000000000000000000001000100	
	3	010000000001000000000000000000-1000
		0000100000010010000000000000001000
		0000010000000000000000000000001000
		00000001000000000000000000000000
00000000100000000000000000000000		
000000000100000000000000100100010		
00000000001000000000000000000000		
000000000000000100000000101000100		
00000000000000001000100200100210		
00000000000000000100000000000000		
00000000000000000001000000000000		
000000000000000000001000-200-100-1-10		
00000000000000000000001000000-1000		
000000000000000000000001200100110		
000000000000000000000000010001000		

Table 10: M_d^* Pomaranch Page 2

$h_i(x)$	$M_d^*(h_i)$
4	10000000000000000000000000000000 00000100000000000000000000000000 00000010000000000000000000000000 00000001000000000000000000000000 00000000100000000000000000000000 00000000000000100000000000000000 000000000000000010000000000010000 00000000000000000010000000000010 00000000000000000000100000000010000 00000000000000000000001000000000100 0000000000000000000000001000000000 0000000000000000000000000010000000 00000000000000000000000000001000-10000 0000000000000000000000000000001000-100 00000000000000000000000000000000
5	1110000000000010000000000000000000 0001000000100100000000000000000000 0000100010000100000000000000000000 0000010001001000000000000002101-1110 0000001000000000000000000000000000 0000000100000000000000000000000000 0000000000001000000000000000000000 0000000000000000100000000101000100 00000000000000000010000010001000010 000000000000000000001000000000000000 000000000000000000001000000000000000 000000000000000000000010000010010001 000000000000000000000010000000000000 0000000000000000000000001000-100-11000 000000000000000000000000001000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000100000

Table 11: M_d^* Pomaranch Page 3

$h_i(x)$	$M_d^*(h_i)$
6	1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3/5 0 -2/5 0 -1/5 -1/5
	0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4/5 0 -1/5 0 2/5 2/5
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4/5 0 -1/5 1/2 -3/5 -1/10
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2/5 0 3/5 1/2 -1/5 3/10
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1/5 0 -1/5 0 2/5 -3/5
	0 1 -1/5 0 -1/5 -1/2 2/5 -1/10
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 1/2 0
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1/5 0 -1/5 0 2/5 -3/5
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/5 0 1/5 0 -2/5 3/5
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3/5 0 -2/5 0 -1/5 -1/5
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -3/5 0 2/5 1/2 -3/10 1/5
	0 1 0 0 0 0 1/5 0 1/5 1/2 3/5 1/10
	0 1 0 0 0 -3/5 0 2/5 0 1/5 1/5
	0 1 0 0 3/5 0 -2/5 -1/2 3/10 -1/5
	0 1 0 4/5 0 -1/5 0 2/5 2/5
7	1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0
	0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
	0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
	0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 1 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0
	0 1 1 0
	0 1 0 -1 -1 0 0
	0 1 1 0 1
	0 1 0 -2 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -2 0 0
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
	0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
	0 1 0 0 0 0 -1
	0 1 -2 -2 -2 -1

Table 12: M_d^* Pomaranch Page 4

$h_i(x)$	$M_d^*(h_i)$
8	1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3/5 -2/5 0 -1/5 0 -1/5
	0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4/5 -1/5 0 2/5 0 2/5
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1/5 -1/5 0 2/5 0 -3/5
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4/5 -1/5 0 -3/5 1/2 -1/10
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2/5 3/5 0 -1/5 1/2 3/10
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1/5 -1/5 0 2/5 -1/2 -1/10
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1/5 -1/5 0 2/5 0 -3/5
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 1/2 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/5 1/5 0 -2/5 0 3/5
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -3/5 2/5 0 1/5 0 1/5
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4/5 -1/5 0 2/5 0 2/5
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3/5 -2/5 0 3/10 -1/2 -1/5
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3/5 -2/5 0 -1/5 0 -1/5
	0 1 0 0 1/5 1/5 0 3/5 1/2 1/10
	0 1 0 -3/5 2/5 0 -3/10 1/2 1/5
	9
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 -1 1 -1/2	
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0	
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1/2 2 0 1/2	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 -1/2 1 0 1/2	
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 -1 0 1/2	
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 0 0 -1/2	
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0	
0 1 -2 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -2 0	
0 1 0 0 0 -1 0 0	
0 1 -1/2 1 1 1/2	

Table 13: M_d^* Pomaranch Page 5

$h_i(x)$	$M_d^*(h_i)$
10	00000010000000000000000000000000
	00000000001000000000000000000000
	00000000000000001000000000000000
	00000000000000000100000000000000
	00000000000000000010000000000000
	0000000000000000000100000000010
	0000000000000000000001000000000
	0000000000000000000000100000-10
	00000000000000000000000100000
	000000000000000000000000010010
	0000000000000000000000000010-10
	000000000000000000000000000110
	00000000000000000000000000000000
	00000000000000000000000000000000
	00000000000000000000000000000000
11	1000011110000000101000000000010
	010001000001000000000000-10-100 1/2 0 1/2
	000100010000001000000000-10-1000 -1/2 -1/2 0
	0000100010010010000000001000 -1/2 1/2 3/2 -1/2
	00000000010000000000000000-1000 -1/2 1/2 0
	00000000001000001000000-11-1000 -1/2 -1/2 0
	0000000000001000001000-100000 -1/2 -1/2 0
	0000000000000100000000101000100
	00000000000000000100000000000 -1/2 -1/2 1/2 -1/2
	00000000000000000010000000000 1/2 1/2 -1/2 1/2
	00000000000000000000100000000 1/2 1/2 -1/2 1/2
	00000000000000000000010000000010
	000000000000000000000001101000 1/2 1/2 0
	0000000000000000000000000001000-10
	00000000000000000000000000001-1/2 -1/2 3/2 1/2

Table 14: M_d^* Pomaranch Page 6

$h_i(x)$	$M_d^*(h_i)$
14	1 1 1 0 0 1 0 -1/2 -1/2 0 0 -1
	0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 0 0 0 1/2
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1/2 1/2 0 1 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 0 0 1/2
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1/2 -1/2 0 1 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1/2 0 0 0 -1/2
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1/2 0 0 -1/2
	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 1/2 0 0 1
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
	0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 -1 0	
0 1 -1 0	

Table 16: M_d^* Pomaranch Page 8

For this section, we will illustrate our result on Pomaranch by using **Theorem 3.1**. We obtained two matrices, M_d^* that have zero row(s) when we injected the fault value via coefficients x_4 and x_3x_4 , but only injection via coefficient x_3x_4 produces annihilators.

For the case when we injected the Pomaranch boolean function via x_4 , we obtained $f = x_1 + x_5 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_5$. The corresponding annihilator $g = x_5 + x_1x_5 + x_3x_5$ did not reduce the complexity to find the initial key string of the injected boolean f ; of the form $1 + f$. We observed $(1 + f) \cdot g = h = x_1x_5(1 + x_2x_3)$. The degree of h is 2 and is the same as $(1 + f)$.

Next, when we injected the Pomaranch boolean function via x_3x_4 , we obtained $f = x_1x_3 + x_2x_4$. The corresponding annihilator is $g = x_1x_2 + x_1x_4 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4$. Observe that $(1 + f) \cdot g = h = (x_1 + x_3) \cdot (x_2 + x_4) = u_1 \cdot u_2$ where $u_1 = (x_1 + x_3)$ and $u_2 = (x_2 + x_4)$.

For the case $(1 + f) = 1$, we assumed $u_1 = 1$ and $u_2 = 1$, and obtained **Table 17**. It shows that in our case the complexity of guessing the initial key bit is $2^2 = 4$. This is a reduction from the complexity of $2^4 = 16$ upon the published Pomaranch boolean function.

We obtained first degree simultaneous equation instead of two degree equation. If

$(1 + f) = 1$, then we have few combinations of $u_1 \cdot u_2 = 1$. If $(1 + f) = 1$, then we have few combinations of $u_1 \cdot u_2$. We assume that $u_1 = 1$ and $u_2 = 1$ and we generate **Table 17** and managed to get only $2^2 = 4$ complexity of guessing compared with the published boolean of Pomaranch that has $2^4 = 16$ complexity to guessing initial key bit.

x_1	x_2	x_3	x_4	$(1 + f)$
1	1	0	0	1
0	0	1	1	1
0	1	1	0	1
1	0	0	1	1

Table 17: Pomaranch : Combination for $(1 + f) = 1$

For the case $(1 + f) = 0$, we assumed either $u_1 = 1$ and $u_2 = 0$ or $u_1 = 0$ and $u_2 = 1$ or $u_1 = 0$ and $u_2 = 0$ and obtained **Table 18**. It shows that in our case the complexity of guessing initial key bit is 12. This is reduction from the complexity of $2^4 = 16$ upon the published Pomaranch boolean function.

x_1	x_2	x_3	x_4	$(1 + f)$
1	1	1	1	0
1	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	1	0
0	0	0	0	0
1	1	1	0	0
1	0	1	1	0
0	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	0
1	1	0	1	0
1	0	0	0	0
0	1	1	1	0
0	0	1	0	0

Table 18: Pomaranch : Combination for $(1 + f) = 0$

6 SUMMARY

From the analysis and results we have generated fourteen injected boolean functions and successfully obtained two possible annihilator(s) of Pomaranch's boolean function via FIA with HAO's method. We then identified that the annihilator, $g = x_1x_2 + x_1x_4 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4$ which was obtained by injecting fault value upon x_3x_4 , had capacity to reduce the complexity of determining the initial key upon our injected Pomaranch boolean function. That is from complexity of $2^5 = 32$ to $2^4 = 16$. In conclusion this identified annihilator provided much needed information on the security of Pomaranch and will be utilized to launch algebraic attacks upon Pomaranch stream cipher.

Coefficient	Annihilators
x_3x_4	$x_1x_2 + x_1x_4 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4$

Table 19: Annihilator upon Pomaranch's Injected Boolean Function

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